Abstract
Introduction
Model checking is an important approach for verification of the properties of hardware, software, multi-agent systems, communication protocols, embedded systems, and so forth. For the logic-based approach of model checking originates from the independent work of two pairs: Quielle and Sifakis [1] and Clarke and Emerson [2] . It is an automatical technique to systematically check whether or not a given finite state model satisfies a logical property.
In the last two decades several famous model checkers such as SPIN [5] and SMV [6] were developed with success. SPIN is an efficient model checker using language Promela (a Process Meta Language) [5] for specifying system models, and using Propositional Linear Temporal Logic (PLTL) formulas for specifying the properties of systems. It has been successfully used to detect design errors in applications ranging from high-level description of distributed computations to detailed code for controlling telephone exchanges [5] . However, the expressiveness of PLTL is equivalent to star free regular expression [7] . Therefore, some properties such as "p holds only at odd states over a sequence of states" cannot be specified by a PLTL formula. Thus, to verify such a property within SPIN, the property is directly encoded into "Never Claim" manually. Unfortunately, this is an error-prone process.
Propositional projection temporal logic (PPTL) [3, 4] is an extension of the propositional interval temporal logic (ITL). Further, a decision procedure for PPTL has been given in [4] . This enables us to verify properties specified in PPTL by model checking based on SPIN. To do so, we first create a Normal Form Graph (NFG) for a given formula P by means of generating Normal Form of P and its sub-formulas. Then we further transform the NFG into a Büchi Automaton (BA). Finally, the BA is transformed into Never Claim. The model of the system is still specified by Promela. Eventually, we can run SPIN to check whether or not the model satisfies the property. Considering expressiveness, the full regular property can be verified by using this approach since the expressive power of PPTL is equivalent to full regular expression [12] . In this paper, as a case study, we try to verify Needham-Schroeder Public-key Protocol by considering both finite and infinite models of PPTL formulas. We model the agents taking part in the protocol as ProMeLa processes. We also model the most general intruder who can observe and intercept messages, and so learn information, such as the values of nonces, and then use this information to introduce fake messages into the system. In the second part of the paper, a verification approach based on SPIN is proposed to verify the Russian cards problem. To do so, the model of the protocol is specified by Promela in SPIN, and the safe property is specified by a PPTL formula. The verification job is done based on SPIN. In addition, as shown in Fig.1 , we have developed a plug-in PPTL2Never for SPIN, which can transform a PPTL formula into Never Claim as a syntax structure of Promela. For convenience, we name the SPIN with PPTL2Never as PPTL model checker. And we use PPTL model checker to study the safety of Needham-Schroeder Public-key Protocol.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2, 3 introduces Needham-Schroeder PublicKey Protocol, and its model written by Promela language. In Section 4 the syntax and semantics of PPTL and its normal form as well as the corresponding NFG are presented. Section 5 briefly shows how to define the property in PPTL for Needham-Schroeder Public-key Protocol, and carefully studies the transformation of the PPTL formula to Never Claim. Section 6 in detail gives verification results of the protocol. Section 7 is a conclusion.
Needham-Schroeder Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol [9] aims to establish mutual authentication between an initiator A and a responder B. The protocol uses public key cryptography [10] . Each agent A possesses a public key, denoted K a , which any other agent can obtain from a key server. It also possesses a secret key K a -1 , which is the inverse of K a . We will write {m} k for message m encrypted with key k. Any agent can encrypt a message m using A's public key to produce {m} Ka ; only A can decrypt this message, so this ensures secrecy.
The protocol also uses nonces: random numbers generated with the purpose of being used in a single run of the protocol. We denote nonces by N a and N b : the subscripts are intended to denote that the nonces were generated by A and B, respectively.
The complete Needham-Schoreder Public-Key Protocol involves seven steps. However, in this paper we consider a reduced version with only three steps. In the steps we omit, the two agents request and receive each other's public from a key server: omitting these steps is equivalent to assuming that each agent initially has the other's public key. The reduced protocol can be described as: At the first step, A initiates a session with B by encrypting her nonce N a and identity with B's public key. Then she sends the encrypted message to B (message 1). At the next step, B decrypts message 1 to obtain N a , then encrypts the nonce and his own nonce N b by using A's key, after that returns the encrypted message to A (message 2). At the last step, when A receive message 2, she assures she is talking to B since only B can decrypt message 1 to obtain N a . Then, A returns the nonce N b to B. Similarly, B is sure that he is talking to A since only A can decrypt message 2 to obtain N b .
Promela Model of Needham-Schroeder Public-key Protocol
Let us first look at the ProMeLa model of the protocol which ever been build by Stephan Merz [11] . We add several Boolean variables in the model to support the definition of property using PPTL formula. Here we assume that the reader is familiar with Promela, which is a guarded-command language with C-like syntax, and provides primitives for message channels and operations for sending and receiving messages. The protocol model is composed by tree processes respectively for two honest agents, Alice and Bob and an intruder. The network used by agents and intruder is represented of the form: mtype = {msg1, msg2, msg3, alice, bob, intruder, nonceA, nonceB, nonceI, keyA, keyB, keyI, ok, fail};
typedef Crypt { mtype key, d1, d2 }; chan network = [0] of {Crypt, mtype, /* msg#*/ mtype /*receiver*/};
Where mtype is of enumeration type and contains several constants: identities of message (msg1, msg2, msg3), identities of agents (Alice, Bob, intruder),pre-computed nonces (nonceA, nonceB, nonceI for two agents and intruder separately), public keys (KeyA for Alice, KeyB for Bob and KeyI for intruder). Encrypted messages are defined as a user-defined structure which contains a key and two data entries. The network is modeled as a message channel shared by all three agents. Symbol "[0]" denotes the channel allows only synchronous communication. Following the symbol is the format of message, which is formed by a encrypted message together with two data entries: the first denotes what kind the message is, the second represents who receive the message.
For the Promela representation of agent Alice, initially, a partner (either bob or intruder) is chosen nondeterministically by using a if-statement (the token :: introduce the different alternatives of nondeterministic selection). Then, Alice sends her message (message 1) to the chosen partner and waits for a response message. When the message from the partner arrives, Alice firstly checks whether or not the message body is encrypted with her key, if so, then she verify if the message contains the nonce belonging to her. (Promela allows Boolean conditions to appear as statements; such a statement blocks if the condition is found to be false.) After that, Alice returns the partner's nonce to the partner, declaring success. The first choice in the if-statement represents reception or interception of a message. Other choices represent the intruder sends messages. If the intruder cannot decrypt the intercepted message, he can make a message by using the intercepted message body (stored in variable intercepted), or generate a new message to delivery. Otherwise, the intruder will construct a fake message by using the decrypted nonce and his own nonce. Obviously, most of the messages generated by intruder can be immediately recognized being inappropriate by honest agents, so the model includes many deadlocks, which can be ignored in the following analysis.
Propositional Projection Temporal Logic
This section briefly introduces Propositional Projection Temporal Logic (PPTL), Normal Form (NF) and Normal Form Graph (NFG). The details of the logic can be found in [4] .
Syntax
Let Prop be the set of atomic propositions. The formula of PPTL is given by the following grammar:
where p∈ Prop. A formula is called a state formula if it does not contain any temporal operators otherwise it is a temporal formula. The following are some useful derived formulas.
Normal Form and Normal Form Graph
The normal form in this paper is the same as the one we gave in [4] . For convenience, let L pptl denote the set of propositional projection temporal logic formulas. We now define the normal form of PPTL formulas as follows.
Definition 1. (Normal Form of PPTL Formulas) let Q∈L pptl , Q is called a normal form, if Q can be written as:
Where l + n ≥1, Q ej , Q i are state formulas and Q' is an arbitrary formula. For convenience, in some circumstances, we simply write Q e ˄ ɛ instead of Q ej ˄ ɛ. Also, we call conjuncts Q ej ˄ ɛ, 
Constructing a Normal Form Graph
In order to construct an automaton for a given PPTL formula P, P is first transformed into its Normal Form Graph (NFG). The NFG of P is a directed graph, G(P) = (CL(P),EL(P)), where CL(P) denotes the set of nodes and EL(P) the set of edges. Each node is specified by a formula in PPTL, while each edge is identified by a triple (Q,Q e , R) meaning that the directed arc from node Q to node R with labeling Q e in the form of conjunction of atomic propositions or their negation. CL(P) and EL(P) can be inductively defined in Definition 2.
Definition 2. (Normal Form Graph) For a PPTL formula P, set of nodes CL(P) and set of edges EL(P) of G(P) can be inductively defined as follows: 1. P∈CL(P); 2. For all Q∈CL(P)\{ɛ, false}, if , then ɛ∈CL(P) , (Q, Q ej , ɛ) ∈EL(P)for each j,1≤ j ≤ h; Q i '∈CL(P),( Q,Q ci ,Q i ')∈EL(P) for all i, 1≤ ij ≤ k; 3. CL(P) and EL(P) are only generated by 1 and 2; Thus NFG of P can be defined as a directed graph G given by G(P)=( CL(P), EL(P)).
To depict the NFG of P, the root node P is denoted by a double circle, ɛ node by a small black dot, and each of other nodes by a single circle. If the main operator within a conjunct of the formula identifying a node is chop (;), a letter F is placed in the node. Each edge is denoted by a directed arc connecting two nodes. An algorithm for rewriting a formula to its NFG can be found in [4] .
Verifying Needham-Schroeder Protocol
With the verification process as shown in Fig.1 , the property is defined by a PPTL formula; the formula is then transformed to its normal form; the normal form is then converted to its NFG; the NFG is further transformed to a Never Claim. The conversion of a PPTL formula into a corresponding NFG has been discussed in [4] . Here, we just focus on the transformation of NFG to Never Claim.
The property specified in PPTL
Note based on the model originally written by Merz, we add two Boolean variables (msg1_send, msg2_send which are initially assigned false and turn true whenever the corresponding messages are sent) in agent Alice and Bob. The Boolean variables partnerA and partnerB are assigned values once and for all. Especially before message 1 is sent, Alice has given a value to partnerA and the value remains to the end of the protocol. And it is same for partnerB in agent Bob. Therefore, we focus on the value of partnerA and partnerB only at the moment when messages are sent. To assure the honest agents talks to each other, partnerA should be Bob when message 1 is sent, and partnerB should be Alice when message 2 is delivered. This property can be defined by the following PPTL formula: Since message 1 cannot be sent at the beginning of the protocol, we employ "sometimes" operator ◊ to precisely capture this feature. According to the definition of derived formulas, we have
As refereed, to perform the verification the property formula firstly needs to be negated, and then translated to NFG. The normal forms used for constructing the NFG of ￢φ is listed as follows:
As shown in Fig. 2(1) , the NFG of ￢φ is generated, where node v 0 and v 1 correspond to formulas ￢φ and ￢(true; (q prj v)) respectively. And the node corresponding to ɛ is depicted by a black dot. In addition, there is no node which is marked F since the main operator of underlying formula is not chopped.
Correspondence between NFGs and Automata
PPTL formulas are interpreted over both finite and infinite models. All the infinite paths in an NFG of P correspond to infinite models while all the finite paths correspond finite models of P. Actually, an NFG can be treated as a Büchi automaton. The set of nodes is in fact the set of locations; each edge (P i , P e , P j ) forms a transition; there exists only one initial location, the root node; the set of accepting locations consists of the nodes which can appear in infinite paths for infinite many times. Given an NFG G = (V, E, v 0 ) of formula P, a Büchi automaton, B = (Q, I, δ, F), over an alphabet ∑ can be constructed as follows:
Alphabet ∑: Let P p be the set of atomic propositions appearing in P, and |P p |=l. Let q ji denotes either q ji or -q ji . We define sets A i (1 ≤ i ≤ l) and the alphabet ∑ for the Büchi automaton of formula P as follows.
Set of the locations Q and the initial locations I:Q=V, and I={v 0 }. Transition δ: Let q k be an atomic proposition, we define a function atom ( t k ) for picking up atomic propositions or their negations appearing in t k as follows,
atom(true)=｛true｝
For each e i =(v i , Q c , vi+1 )∈ E, let v i+1 ∈δ (v i , atom(Q c )); For node ɛ, let δ(ɛ, τ)= {ɛ}, which is called stutter extension [5] .
Accepting locations F: It is proved in [4] that in infinite paths in an NFG precisely characterize the infinite models of the corresponding formula. In fact, an infinite path exists if and only if some nodes in the path, which are not marked with F, occur for infinitely many times. So the nodes which are not marked with F and appear in infinite paths for infinitely many times are defined as the accepting states in the Büchi automaton. In addition, by employing the stutter extension [5] , node ɛ is also accepting location.
Given a PPTL formula P, let G(P) denote the NFG of P and B(P) the Büchi automaton corresponding to G(P).
Theorem1. (Correspondence between NFGs and automata)
Given an arbitrary PPTL formula P, Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in [8] .
The Büchi automaton of φ is shown in Fig2.2 , where all nodes are acceptance nodes and are depicted by concentric circles. The self-circle τ on node ɛ is a so-called stutter extension. 
Correspondence between NFGs and Automata
The transformation from B(-φ) to Never Claim is straightforward. The following given the Never Claim for formula -φ, where node accept _S0 (resp. accept_S1) corresponds to v 0 (resp. v 1 ) in the automaton, the prefix "accept_" denote the node is an acceptance node. The if-statement under a node"s label denotes transitions from the node (source node). Each choice is obtained from an edge emanating from the source node since the choice is formed by a condition, a symbol "→" followed by a sink node, and the condition precisely corresponds the label of the edge. Node "accepting_all" is obtained from node ɛ in the automaton. Since the self-transition on node ɛ in B(-φ) is a stutter extension and thus has no meaning, we only use "skip" as a placeholder under the node"s label to mean do nothing. 
Experiment
As referred the conversion of PPTL formula into its NFG and further to the final Never Claim is totally completed by an automatic tool named PPTL2Never, which have been developed by us and plugged into the panel of SPIN in order to support PPTL model checking. We just provide the PPTL formula it automatically produces the corresponding Never Claim, meanwhile, adds the Never Claim into the protocol model, and then starts up the verification system. Given the protocol model and the property to verify, PPTL model checker shows that the property does not hold on the model, and return trails as shown in Fig.3 , where the left one is the most famous attack found early, here we just focus on the right one which found by using the PPTL property proposed in this paper. At first Intruder send message 1 to change for Bob's nonce (nonceB) with its own nonce (nonceI), and then use nonceB to communicate with Alice. That shows that intruder get the nonce of Bob and then use it to deceive Alice into communicating with him. In the model we need add a data entry into structure Crypt, which is the identity of the message"s sender:
typedef Crypt { mtype key, d1, d2, sender } Then right after receiving message 2 in process Alice, an assertion (data.sender == partnerA) ˄ (data.key == keyA) ˄(data.d1 == nonceA) is used to guarantee the sender of message 2 is the receiver of message 1. Besides, we need to rebuild sending message 2 in both processes Bob and Intruder: data.on = Bob; network ! msg2(Alice, data); Repeating the verification by using this fixed model, it"s proved that the mode satisfies the property.
Conclusion

